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court more freedom in protecting the rights of the defendant
from unwarranted publicity. However, in view of the traditional
sanctity of the First Amendment liberties, 25 it is doubtful that
such a result is wholly desirable.
David W. Robertson
CRIMINAL LAW - MISCEGENATION - DEFINITION OF
"COHABITATION"
Defendants were convicted of miscegenation. The indictment,
tracing the language of Article 79 of the Louisiana Criminal
Code,' charged that defendants did habitually cohabit with each
other, he being of the Negro race and she being of the white race.
The trial judge in charging the jury defined cohabitation as access
for the purpose of sexual intercourse, and defined habitual co-
habitation as access for the purpose of sexual intercourse as a
matter of habit. On appeal, held, reversed. The phrase "habitual
cohabitation" as used in Article 79 means customary or repeated
acts of sexual intercourse. Under the trial court's instruction in
the instant case an accused could be convicted of miscegenation
without any evidence that sexual intercourse had occurred. State
v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233 (La. 1959) .2
test would bar reversals for all but the most flagrantly scurrilous or deceptive
newspaper attacks. Courts . . . have always recognized that printed matter may
be prejudicial enough to require a new trial without evidencing so depraved an
attitude of the publisher as to support a contempt citation." (Emphasis added.)
Language to this effect, it could be argued, is at least a minute indication that the
Supreme Court might see a clear and present danger in newspaper attacks inclined
to prejudice a criminal defendant.
25. "The First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law
'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' It must be taken as a command
of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving
society, will allow." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
1. LA. R.S. 14:79 (1905) : "Miscegenation is the marriage or habitual co-
habitation with knowledge of their difference in race, between a person of the
Caucasian or white race and a person of the colored or negro race.
"Whoever commits the crime of miscegenation shall be imprisoned, with or
without hard labor, for not more than five years."
Louisiana's miscegenation article is somewhat unique in that it combines a
prohibition of intermarriage with a prohibition of "cohabitation." Twenty-six
states prohibit intermarriage between Negroes and Caucasians and attach either
civil or criminal sanctions, but only three other states have the double prohibition
that Louisiana has. Five states besides Louisiana have various prohibitions re-
lating to sex relations between Negroes and Caucasians. Of all these states, only
one besides Louisiana uses the word "cohabit." MURRAY, STATEs' LAWS ON RACE
AND COLOR (1951).
2. The court also held in the instant case that Article 79 of the Criminal Code
does not violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions,
but a discussion of this aspect is without the scope of this note.
NOTES
The word "cohabit" comes from the Latin "co" (with) and
"habitare" (to dwell, to have possession of). The common dic-
tionary definition is "to dwell or live together as husband and
wife."' 3 In a legal sense, however, its definition has ranged from
a dwelling together without coition,4 to dwelling together with
sexual intercourse,5 to mere sexual intercourse," to access to
sexual intercourse.7
The word is used in many different senses, and to give it
proper effect regard must be had to the subject matter to which
it relates, to the situation and conditions in respect to which it
is used, and to the explanatory language accompanying it.8 Gen-
erally speaking, the meaning of the word in a given instance can
be determined from the context in which it was used, which re-
flects the legislative intent. Thus, while no universal meaning is
ascertainable, it may be seen that the definitions are fairly con-
sistent within certain broad categories.
Where the nature of the statute suggests that it was designed
to prevent public scandal, the courts have consistently construed
the word "cohabit," as used therein, to mean living together. In
cases involving the interpretation of statutes prohibiting "lewd
and promiscous" or "lewd and lascivious" cohabitation, the
courts have held the word to mean living together as man and
wife,9 it being pointed out that such a statute is not designed to
prevent mere fornication.'0 In defining cohabit as used in polyg-
amy statutes, the courts have been consistent in holding that it
means living together as husband and wife," the purpose of such
3. WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957).
4. Hunt v. Hunt, 172 Miss. 732, 161 So. 119 (1935).
5. State v. Gieseke, 125 Minn. 497, 147 N.W. 663 (1914).
6. State v. Hoffman, 68 N.D. 610, 282 N.W. 407 (1938).
7. State v. Freddy, 117 La. 121, 41 So. 436 (1906). See Tate v. Penne, 7
Mart.(N.S.) 548 (La. 1829).
8. Pearsons v. Pearsons, 282 Ill. App. 92 (1935); Bracksmayer v. Bracks-
mayer, 175 Misc. 303, 22 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1940) ; Burchfield v. Burchfield, 5
Wash.2d 359, 105 P.2d 286 (1940).
9. Luster v. State, 23 Fla. 339, 342, 2 So. 690, 692 (1887) ("object of the
statute is to prohibit public scandal and disgrace of such living together by per-
sons of opposite sexes who are unmarried to each other) ; Tribbey v. State, 189
Ind. 205, 126 N.E. 481 (1920) ; State v. Kirkpatrick, 63 Iowa 554, 19 N.W. 660
(1884) ; The King v. Kalailoa, 4 Hawaii 39 (1877) ; State v. Dashman, 124
Mo. App. 238, 101 S.W. 597 (1907) ; Sweenie v. State, 59 Neb. 269, 80 N.W.
815 (1899) ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 965, 146 S.E. 289 (1929). See
State v. Tuttle, 129 Me. 125, 150 Atl. 490 (1930) (habitual acts of illicit inter-
course are necessary elements of the crime of lewd and lascivious cohabitation).
10. Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 18 (1885).
11. Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885) ; United States v. Langford,
2 Idaho, 561, 21 Pac. 409 (1889) ; United States v. Kuntze, 2 Idaho 446, 21 Pac.
407 (1889) ; State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944).
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statutes being to prevent a man from "flaunting in the face of
the world, the ostentation and opportunities of a bigamous house-
hold. 1 2 In statutes prohibiting acts which are generally consid-
ered wrong per se, the courts have more narrowly construed the
word. Where pandering statutes prohibit placing a woman in
any house or place for the purpose of cohabiting with any male,
the courts have said that the lawmakers clearly intended the
word cohabit definitely to mean the mere having of sexual inter-
course.18 In prosecutions under incest statutes prohibiting co-
habitation within certain degrees of relationship, the courts have
uniformly held cohabit to be simply sexual intercourse.1
4
Where the word is used in laws validating what would other-
wise be illegal relationships, the lawmakers seem merely to be
giving effect to the good faith intent of the parties involved and
the courts have guided their interpretations accordingly. Thus,
it is uniformly held that in order to establish a common law mar-
riage, the cohabitation necessary is a living or dwelling together
in the same habitation as husband and wife and not merely a
12. United States v. Snow, 4 Utah 280, 282, 9 Pac. 501, 505 (1886).
13. Boykin v. United States, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 147, 150, 130 F.2d 416, 421
(1942). Statute defining pandering as procuring woman for purpose of causing
her illegally to "cohabit" with any male. "Cohabit in the familial sense is hardly
characteristic of a house of prostitution. . . . The purpose clearly was to use
'cohabit' as including promiscuous and casual relations." Shortly after this case
was decided the law was amended, leaving out the word "cohabit." 54 STAT.
1226, c. 936, § 3, 49 U.S.C. § 73 (1941). See also Martin v. Commonwealth, 195
Va. 1107, 81 S.E.2d 574 (1954).
14. State v. Alexander, 216 La. 932, 939, 45 So.2d 83, 85 (1950) ("The elements
of the offense are the intercourse coupled with knowledge of the relationship") ;
State v. Grantham, 150 La. 621, 91 So. 66 (1922) (rejecting defendant's conten-
tion that a single act of sexual intercourse is insufficient to constitute cohabita-
tion) ; State v. Spurling, 115 La. 789, 791, 40 So. 167, 167 (1906). ("The statute
forbids both intermarriage and cohabitation without marriage, and the word 'co-
habit' in the sense of the statute implies intercourse between a man and a woman
who are not married") ; State v. De Hart, 109 La. 570, 574, 33 So. 605, 606
(1903) ("[defendant] is charged with carnally knowing his own daughter ....
[I]t was cohabitation with one related to him within the degree of consanquinity
prohibited by law"); Matthews v. State, 115 Neb. 158, 211 N.W. 942 (1927).
Of. State v. Freddy, 117 La. 121, 124, 41 So. 437 (1906) ("In the present
statute [Act 78 of 1884] we think the meaning [of cohabit] is simply that of
sexual intercourse, as in our laws upon marriage and legitimacy. . . . When the
statute makes use of the expression 'shall intermarry, or cohabit without mar-
riage,' it uses the word cohabit in the same sense as do the Articles 188 and 189,
Revised Civil Code, when they speak of the possibility of the husband's 'cohabiting'
with his wife. These articles do not use the word in the sense of the possibility
of the husband's 'dwelling with his wife' . . . but simply of the possibility of his
having access to her." The court here cited Tate v. Penne, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 548,
554 (La. 1829), which, interpreting LA. CIVIM CODE art. 11 (1808), dealing with
presumption of paternity, said: "In case of voluntary separation, access is always
presumed unless the contrary be proved; the presumption of paternity is at an
end, when the remoteness of the husband from the wife has been such that cohabi-
tation has been physically impossible").
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sojourning or a habit of visiting or remaining together for a
time with sexual intercourse. 15 Where subsequent cohabitation
will make a marriage valid in spite of the parties' failure to com-
ply properly with the provisions regarding marriage licenses,
such cohabitation has been held to consist of a public assumption
by a man and woman of the marital relation and dwelling to-
gether as such.16
The word cohabit is not new to our jurisprudence. It ap-
peared in the Civil Code of 1808 in the article17 taken directly
from the Code Napoleon' 8 dealing with the disavowal of pater-
nity. One of the earliest cases 9 construing the article in that
context apparently defined cohabitation in terms of "access" as
did the trial court in the instant case.
Article 79 of the Criminal Code traces its origin to a 1908
statute which provided the basis for the 1910 concubinage stat-
ute.2 0 Both of these old statutes defined concubinage as the "un-
15. To cohabit is to live or dwell together, so, that, where one lives and dwells
so does the other live and dwell with him- a common law marriage is not shown
by irregular cohabitation. Gilbreath v. Lewis, 242 Ala. 510, 7 So.2d 485 (1942) ;
Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 Pac. 1049 (1897) ; Orr v. State, 129 Fla.
398, 176 So. 510 (1937) ; Ridley v. Compton, 215 Miss. 532, 61 So.2d 341 (1952) ;
Jones v. Lamensdorf, 175 Miss. 565, 167 So. 624 (1936) ; In re Miller's Estate,
182 Okla. 534, 78 P.2d 819 (1938). By cohabitation is not meant simply the
gratification of the sexual passions, but to live or dwell together, to have the same
habitation, so that where one lives and dwells there does the other live and dwell.
Miller v. Sutherland, 131 Mont. 175, 309 P.2d 322 (1957).
16. Hunt v. Hunt, 172 Miss. 732, 742, 161 So. 119, 121 (1935) : "The word
cohabitation as used in the marriage laws means public assumption by a man and
woman of the marital relation and dwelling together as such .... Cohabitation may
be without coition."
17. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 11, p. 46 (1808) : "The presumption of the paternity
as an incident to the marriage, is also at an end, when the remoteness of the hus-
band from the wife has been such that co-habitation has been physically impos-
sible."
18. FRENCH CODE CIVIL art. 312, par. 2, which provides that a husband could
disavow a child if he could prove that "it was physically impossible for him, by
reason of this remoteness from his wife or because of some accident, to cohabit
with her." ("[S]oit par cause d'dlignement, soit par L'effet de quelque accident,
dans l'impossibilitd physique de cohabiter avec sa Jemme.")
19. Tate v. Penne, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 548 (La. 1829).
20. La. Acts 1908, No. 87, reads in part: "That concubinage between a person
of the Caucasian or white race and a person of the negro or black race is hereby
made a felony . . . . [T]hat the living together or cohabitation of persons of the
Caucasian and of the negro races shall be proof of the violation . . . of this act.
For the purpose of this act concubinage is hereby defined to be the unlawful co-
habitation of persons of the Caucasian and of the negro races whether open or
secret." On April 25, 1910, in State v. Treadaway, 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910),
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed an acquittal of a man who had been in-
dicted under the act of cohabiting with "a person of the negro or black race, to
wit, an octoroon," on grounds that an octoroon was not a person of the negro or
black race within the meaning of the act. As an indication of public sentiment
of the time, it would be well to note a story which appeared in the Daily-Times
in Baton Rouge on the same day. "N.O. Apr. 25 -That a great deal of the
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lawful cohabitation of persons of the Caucasian and of the col-
ored races whether open or secret." The definition of cohabit
was put squarely in issue under the latter act within a relatively
short time after passage. 21 The result was somewhat less than
satisfactory insofar as a workable definition was not formed,
but the opinion of the court regarding this point bears repetition
as an example of the confusion that has surrounded this word:
"[T] he . . .contention of . . .counsel for the defendant is .. .
that, having defined the concubinage denounced by the statute to
be 'unlawful cohabitation of persons of the Caucasian and col-
ored races, whether open or secret,' it was then necessary for the
Legislature to define also 'cohabitation' or 'unlawful cohabita-
tion.' The answer is that the Legislature did define the unlawful
cohabitation by declaring it to be concubinage between persons
of the different races, whether open or secret. 'Cohabitation' is
a word of such generally known meaning that it was no more
necessary to give it a legislative definition than to give any other
word in the statute a legislative definition. '22 No further at-
tempt to define judicially "cohabitation" in this context was
made until the instant case.
The most complete examination of the word "cohabitation"
in our jurisprudence has been with regard to the law against
incest which first appeared as Act 78 of 1884. In construing
the word as used therein, the Louisiana Supreme Court has con-
sistently held it to mean sexual intercourse.23 In reaching the
conclusion in the instant case that cohabitation as used in Ar-
ticle 79 means sexual intercourse, the Supreme Court reasoned
that since the miscegenation article immediately followed the
incest article and that since both were under the subpart of the
Criminal Code dealing with "sex offenses affecting the family,"
a reasonable analogy could be drawn between the use of the
word in the two articles. The court then cited one of the early
cases 24 construing the word under the incest statute then in
legislation in Louisiana directed toward the separation of the white and colored
races will have to be revised was indicated today by the decision of the State
Supreme Court which said that many of these laws do not apply to octoroons or
[other] persons of mixed blood. Many of the laws merely use the word negro in
the text." Within the month, the legislature being in session, Act 206 of 1910
was passed using the precise language of Act 87 of 1908 with the exception that
where the old act used "negro or black race" the new act used "colored or black
race."
21. State v. Daniel, 141 La. 900, 75 So. 836 (1917).
22. Id. at 900, 75 So. at 837.
23. See note 13 supra.
24. State v. Freddy, 117 La. 121, 41 So. 436 (1906).
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NOTES
effect, and applied that interpretation to the miscegenation
article.
In regard to the meaning of "habitual" as used in Article 79,
the court used the literal definition offered in the dictionary,
25
and held habitual cohabitation means customary or repeated acts
of sexual intercourse. About the only context in which the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court has previously defined "habitual" has been
in connection with "habitual drunkenness" or "habitual intem-
perance." In this respect it was early held that habitual drunken-
ness meant "drunk by custom or habit, '2 and this definition has
been consistently followed.2 7 It has been stated, no doubt cor-
rectly, that the word "habitual" is not one of technical significa-
tion, but should be understood in its common acceptation.
28
The soundness of the definition given the word "cohabit" by
the court in the instant case would ultimately depend upon the
purpose of the legislature. If the miscegenation article was de-
signed to prevent public scandal, then an analogy could be drawn
to the "lewd and lascivious" cohabitation and polygamy statutes29
and the trial court's broad interpretation in terms of "access"
would seem proper. If, in passing the act, it was felt that mis-
cegenation was wrong per se, then the definition of the Supreme
Court was appropriate inasmuch as it followed the pattern estab-
lished in the incest and pandering cases. 30 It is suggested that
the obvious uncertainty could be avoided, as it has been in other
jurisdictions with similar statutes, by legislative amendment
eliminating the word cohabit and substituting therefor more
specific terminology.31
Maurice J. Naquin Jr.
25. WEsTTR's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1122 (2d ed. 1957).
26. Mack v. Handy, 39 La. Ann. 491, 2 So. 181 (1887).
27. Broderick v. Broderick, 191 La. 492, 186 So. 5 (1939) ; Saint v. Irion,
165 La. 1035, 116 So. 549 (1928) ; Schaub v. Schaub, 117 La. 727, 42 So. 249
(1906).
28. Collum v. State, 10 Tex.App. 708 (1881) (dealing with habitual carnal
intercourse).
29. See notes 8-11 supra. It is interesting to note that in State v. Hovis, 162
Ark. 1, 257 S.W. 362 (1924), the Arkansas Supreme Court in construing the
legislative intent behind a statute with almost identical language as our old con-
cubinage acts reached the opposite conclusion from the Louisiana Supreme Court
in the instant case.
30. See notes 14, 15 supra.
31. See ALA. CODE 14:360 (1940) (live in adultery or fornication) ; FLA.
STATS. ANN. § 798.04 (1941) (live in adultery or fornication) ; N.D. REV. CODE
§ 14-0304 (1943) (live in and occupy the same room) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 8409
(Williams, 1934) (living together as man and wife).
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